Technology and cost are motivating more and more developers to put more and more of their "secret sauce" in programmable logic. This is great for the consumer as it opens the market to the smaller players. However, it also opens the market for IP theft; after all, why spend years making something yourself if you can just pilfer it and re-brand it as your own. A sad statement for sure but it is the reality of the world we live in. Worsening the situation is the fact that FPGA's and SoC's are starting to become the anchor for the security of larger systems. This now brings in another set of bad guys; ones that are tech savvy and armed with lab equipment. They are not looking for your IP but are looking to break into the system your IP is protecting. The number of adversaries is growing just as fast as the markets for the devices themselves and is quickly becoming an arms race.
The first volley was fired when the adversaries started reverse engineering the programming files (bitstreams) so we added bitstream encryption (3-DES at the time). However, commercial computational power rendered that algorithm obsolete, so we moved to AES-256. The adversary gave up attacking the algorithm and started going after the key itself, so we added physical protections. Failing to break into the device they opted for less physically invasive attacks such as Differential Power Analysis, so we added authentication before decryption and key rolling. Frustrated with these and other protections the adversary went back to physical attacks. This was aided by the everexpanding capabilities of Failure Analysis which needs the same equipment to understand device failures as attackers need to break into devices. They started with circuit probing and edits using the Focus Ion Beam (FIB). This allowed them to disable security features or tap into the key space. To counter this redundancy and circuit obfuscation techniques were added. They then switched to less destructive imaging methods which forced us to levy system requirements (detection and prevention techniques) on the customer; costly but effective.
The security of FPGAs and SoCs has greatly evolved over the years but the next battlefield in the arms race is on the horizon: FPGAs / SoC's in the cloud. Most of the security in modern day devices primarily considers an attacker on the outside of the device with close physical access. As such, most of the mitigations make a similar assumption. However, devices in the cloud creates an entire new form of device warfare; remote attacks on FPGAs and SoCs. This is not an issue of hacking software; that has been around since before the internet. It is about the number of devices in the cloud that are programmable and, therefore, hackable. Side channel attacks such as rowhammer (1) and CLKscrew (2) show that if there are secrets and some level of device access, the attackers will find a way to exploit it. In this modern era, security engineers are going to have to look for adversaries where they would never expect them; inside the system. This brings up the following challenges:

How do we protect a system when the adversary is, by necessity, inside the system (IoT, FPGAs as a service, V2X, etc)?
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